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BRITISH POLICY TOWARD GREECE, 1941-1944

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Description

An analysis of British policy in Greece in the light of British interests, and with reference to the events of the last three years.

Washington

9 February 1945

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SUMMARY

Britain is bound to Greece by close sentimental ties and important economic and strategic interests, which make Greek politics a matter of special British concern. The United States and Soviet governments have recognized the importance of these interests and refrained from direct intervention in Greek affairs, even though not sympathizing with all phases of British policy toward Greece. The British government, despite official statements to the contrary, has consistently supported Greek rightist elements and opposed Greek moderate and leftist elements, apparently in the hope of installing in Greece a "stable" government upon whose continuous cooperation it could rely. This policy, which has led directly to the present situation (February 1945), appears to derive from fundamental misconceptions which may be attributed, in considerable part, to faulty intelligence supplied by ill-selected British personnel.

In dealing with the Greek resistance movement, British authorities have distinguished among the various resistance groups primarily on the basis of their political orientation. Beginning in the summer of 1943 they withdrew support from the largest, best organized, and most effective resistance group, EAM-ELAS, despite the fact that it probably represented a majority of Greek opinion, was not predominantly Communist, and was primarily concerned with achieving a liberated and indpendent Greece. At the same time the British increased their support of other and smaller groups (EDES, EKKA, Khi, etc.) which were hostile to EAM-ELAS although not comparably effective in resistance to the Germans. The British also refrained from denouncing the collaborationist but anti-EAM Security Battalions, and recruited special royalist and anti-EAM Greek army units (Mountain Brigade, etc.) for later use in Greece.

In dealing with Greek politics, the British have regularly supported the government-in-exile in resisting efforts to persuade it to broaden its political base. They have until quite recently supported the King in his refusal to accede to demands for a clear statement that he would

not return to Greece in advance of a plebiscite. They have repressed manifestations of anti-royalist sentiment in areas under their military control. After June 1944 they completely controlled the government-in-exile through the person of Premier Papandreou, who repeatedly followed British instructions without consulting his cabinet.

Since the German evacuation of Greece the legal basis for the presence of British armed forces there has not been clear. Events have tended to fortify the leftist charge that they were kept there in order to destroy the influence of EAM-ELAS and install a royalist dictatorship. Since their arrival in Greece the British have continued to support anti-ELAS organizations and build up their own armed force as well as that of the (rightist) Greek army units, at the same time supporting Papandreou's insistence that ELAS disband unconditionally. Failure to agree to ELAS's conditions led to the cabinet crisis of 1-2 December and the outbreak of fighting between ELAS and the Greek government and British forces. Efforts to effect a compromise were frustrated by the British government's refusal to modify its position until the end of December, when Messrs. Churchill and Eden decided to advise the King to appoint a regent.

The government instituted by the Regent under General Plastiras has shown itself equally amenable to British desires, rightist, and uncompromisingly hostile to EAM. It has striven, apparently with some success, to reduce EAM to its communist core by refusing to regard it as other than communist.

British policy thus far has alienated large sections of the Greek public as well as threatening to impair the solidarity of the United Nations. Thus it would seem to be in the long-run interest of Britain itself, as well as of the Greeks and of the United Nations, to accept and encourage a popularly-supported government (which would include a substantial number of leftist ministers), rather than attempt to support a controlled government, tacit opposition to which would threaten the peace and require repression. Easing of present tensions would seem

to depend on a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the British and the prompt carrying out of the promised elections, under international surveillance.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARD GREECE, 1941-1944

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Nature of British Interests in Greece

1. Traditional and Sentimental Interests.

The English have traditonally felt a greater sympathy for the Greeks than for other remote and small peoples for whose affairs they have shown concern. During the nineteenth century the traditional classical education encouraged British sympathy for the descendants of the ancient Greeks in their struggle against the non-Christian and non-European tyranny of the Turks. The figure of Lord Byron typifies British philhellene sympathies, which have persisted in large sections of the British public until the present.

On the Greek side, Britain was looked upon as Greece's patron in Europe and remained the Greek ideal for European culture, even though ties of religion bound Greece to Russia, and France largely influenced Greek education. On the occasion of the marriage of the Greek Crown Prince to a German princess in January 1938 the Greek press emphasized the bride's descent from Queen Victoria. A typical editorial of the time reads: "Can we ever forget a nation linked with the birth and development of modern Greece,--the England of Navarino and the Treaty of London, of Canning and Gladstone, England whose friendly protection has never failed Greece in any moment of crisis?"

Aside from sentimental bonds, England has interests of a practical character in Greece, economic and, more important, strategic. At times these more "realistic" interests have led the British government to adopt a course of action inconsistent with the traditional sympathies of the British public. Such a disparity between official policy and traditional sentiment has become particularly marked during the past few months.

2. Economic Interests.

British lenders are easily the largest foreign investors in Greece. They take first place not only in holdings of the public debt of nearly £ 89 millions, more than half of which is held by British nationals, but also in foreign lending to Greek industry and public utility companies. The paramount influence in the International Control Commission, which has supervised Greek revenues for the purpose of servicing the guaranteed external loan, has been British.

Apart from the public debt, the largest single British interest is Whitehall Securities, Limited, which has invested nearly £ 5 millions in the lighting, tram, and bus services of Athens. Another £ 5 millions is invested in loans to the chief Greek mortgage bank. Hambro's Bank, which has been the official Greek government banker abroad, is interested in Greek concerns to the extent of over £ 1 million, placed in a chemical works and in loans to various branches of industry through an Anglo-Greek credit institution, the Hellenic and General Trust. A British bank--the Ionian Bank, Limited--is one of Greece's five largest banking institutions; other British companies have invested smaller sums in land reclamation, drainage and mining enterprises, and several British insurance companies have deposited in Greece the guarantee which the Greek government demands before permitting them to open agencies there. In all British capital sunk in private enterprises is thought to amount to nearly £ 15 millions.[1]

3. Strategic Interests.

Greece is of strategic importance to Britain because of its relation to the British Mediterranean defense system. The Mediterraneam serves as a "main arterial road" for Britain to her possessions and

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1. Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics (London, 1938), pp.25-6; John A. Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and The Great Powers (New York, 1944); R & A Report No. 2686, "Political Implications of Greece's Foreign Indebtedness."

interests in the Indian Ocean and the Far East. Along this route Britain has possessions as well as shipping and trade interests which she considers vital. In addition, the British Mediterranean fleet has traditionally served as a powerful adjunct to British diplomacy in Europe. While the British Government has carefully refrained from officially indicating its planning for the future of the Mediterranean, there is as yet no indication that Britain has any intention of giving up her pre-eminent position in this area. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the present British government is determined to maintain, and if possible, enhance, British strength in the Mediterranean.

One of the most vital parts of the British Mediterranean defense system is the Eastern Mediterranean, including Greece. This area is particularly critical from the British point of view, because it is here that important interests of most of the major European powers converge. Under present conditions, as frequently in the past, political developments in this area tend to be heavily influenced by a potential clash of interests between Great Britain and Russia, which has an interest in strengthening its influence in southeastern Europe and on the approaches to the Mediterranean. While Russia has thus far recognized, if one may construe the absence of any expression of Russian disapproval of recent British activities in Greece as such recognition, the vital nature of British interests in the eastern Mediterranean, British strategists must, nevertheless, consider the future possibility of a threat from Russia. Such a possibility would be particularly pressing in the event that the British fail to reach a comprehensive settlement with Russia within the framework of a bilateral pact in a general security system.

Since the future of Russian political action in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean cannot be foreseen with accuracy, the British government obviously feels that it must make preparations for any eventuality. The possibility of a further extension of Russian influence in this area--in the form of an increase of the Russian Black Sea fleet, of a move to open the Straits to Russian war vessels, of the formation

of a Soviet-sponsored South-Slav confederation, or of the inclusion of Turkey within the Russian diplomatic orbit--naturally entails the inclusion of Greece within the strategic planning of the British.

The British clearly consider it essential that they be able to count upon the free use of Greek port facilities and airfields in the event of any future emergency in the Eastern Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill has repeatedly disclaimed any desire on the part of the British government to acquire Greek naval and air bases, and has declared that Britain wants nothing from Greece but her"friendship." Nevertheless it would be unrealistic not to assume that the British government desires to place its relations with Greece on such a basis that it can count on the use of Greek naval and air facilities in case of need.

4. Political Interests.

The present British government is concerned with preventing the spread of Communism in Europe. In those areas which appear to fall within the Russian sphere of influence she recognizes that it is impossible for her effectively to prevent it, and even in Greece Mr. Churchill has sought to avoid the appearance of attacking the form of government practiced by one of the major Allies by designating the Communist opposition in Greece "Trotskyite." The attitude to Communism is an aspect of what appears to be a present trend to divide Europe into British and Russian spheres of influence. The Mediterranean proper, while not part of either of the European spheres, is considered by Britain to be in fact her sphere. She is anxious that Communism should not prevail on the northern shore of the Mediterranean for fear that it might spread thence to the southern shore and thus to the Arab and Moslem world. It is therefore consonant with British policy to forestall the establishment of Communism in Greece.

To ensure that Greece should not turn Communist and that its government should be such as to maintain a consistent policy and honor its engagements, and in keeping with the British predilection for maintaining legitimacy in the government of peoples under its influence,

British policy has favored the restoration of the monarchy in Greece, or failing that, support of a government which should be clothed with sufficient authority and power to ensure its survival and the implementation of its program.

B. The Attitude of the Allies

It is generally understood that both the Soviet and United States governments have recognized the importance of British interests in Greece, and have agreed that Greece is a theater of primary British responsibility in both military and political matters. Consequently both Allies governments have refrained from any direct intervention in Greek affairs, although it has been evident that they did not sympathize with all phases of the British policy toward Greece.

1. The USSR.

The official attitude of the Russian government has conformed to its professions of disinterestedness in Greek affairs, though its sympathies in the internal struggle among the Greeks have clearly been with the EAM. This sympathy was unofficially expressed in connection with the April 1944 mutinies in Egypt;[1] in praise of ELAS prowess in the resistance at a time when the British had ceased to express such praise;[2] in denunciation of the quisling Security Battalions at a time when the British were refraining from such denunciations;[3] and most markedly in the dispatch of a Russian military mission to EAM headquarters in July 1944. The Russian government did not accede to the British desire that it issue a statement in support of the Papandreou government, but on the other hand it refrained from denouncing that government. Russian conduct remained "correct," and when Soviet armies invaded the Balkans Foreign Commissar Molotov gave assurances that they would not cross the Greek frontier.[4] A neutral attitude was maintained

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1. Cf. sec. III, B, below.
2. Cf. sec. II, C, below.
3. Cf. sec. II, B, below.
4. Cf. R & A Report No. 1785.37, 16 December 1944.

by the Soviet press and radio even after the outbreak of fighting between ELAS and the British.

2. The United States.

The United States government has until recently maintained an attitude of aloofness toward Greek affairs, in conformity with its declared policy of not interfering in the internal politics of Allied nations. During the protracted crisis in the spring and summer of 1944 Greek leaders in Cairo, specifically Exindaris and Venizelos, repeatedly petitioned Mr. MacVeagh (the United States Ambassador Near the Greek Government) to seek to modify the attitude of his British colleague; but the Ambassador's replies led them to conclude that the United States had delegated all concern for Greece to Great Britain. In the organization of Military Liaison, which now controls economic and relief operations in Greece, American personnel are outranked by British at each level. UNRRA, whose personnel and supplies are predominantly American, operates under the jurisdiction of Military Liaison. On 28 December UNRRA personnel at a general meeting in Cairo passed resolutions declaring their inability to function under Military Liaison and requesting the right for autonomous action.

Since the evacuation of Greece by the Germans and the restoration of the Greek government to Athens, the United States government has re-emphasized its adherence to the principle of non-interference, and in so doing has implied dissent from the British policy in reference to Greek internal affairs. On 7 December 1944 Secretary of State Stettinius emphasized the American hands-off policy with respect to the internal politics of liberated countries, and specifically endorsed that portion of a statement by Prime Minister Churchill which declared that the Greek people had the right to decide on their own form of government. Similar statements have been made by Mr. MacVeagh in Greece; and General Sadler, ranking American officer in Greece, has by indirection dissociated himself from British policy by declaring that the function of American officers in Greece was only to provide

and distribute relief supplies, and that distributions would be made to both sides in the present conflict without discrimination. On the other hand, American officials have refrained from any open expression of approval of EAM-ELAS. When Greek leftist newspapers, following the December Constitution Square demonstration,[1] stated that MacVeagh had protested to the British ambassador against British intervention in Greek affairs, the American ambassador authorized the Foreign Office to deny these reports with the expressed purpose of avoiding American involvement.

C. The Nature of British Policy Toward Greece

Despite the recognition of Britain's special interest in Greece by the other major Allies, British official spokesmen have repeatedly declared that Britain seeks no special privileges in Greece, has no preferences as regards Greece's future political regime, and desires only to establish conditions in which the Greek people may freely and fairly choose their own rulers. Nevertheless the historical record, as set forth below, strongly suggests that the British government has used its influence in Greek politics to favor the interests of one Greek political faction against all others.

Most Greeks, together with some sections of the British public, have tended to assume that whatever interests Great Britain had in Greece would be safeguarded by the traditionally friendly relations between the two peoples. The British government, however, has apparently distrusted the volatile character of Greek politics, with its rapid changes of governments and policies, and has felt that its interests would be better served by the existence in Greece of a "stable" government, upon whose continuous cooperation it could rely.

Specifically, with Russian competition in the Near East looming large, the British government seems to have definitely preferred a rightist government for Greece to one that was, or might turn leftist.

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1. Cf. Section IV, D, below.

Apparently the British have decided that a leftist or potentially leftist government, which might be expected to have political and sentimental ties with Soviet Russia, could not be relied upon for cooperation with Great Britain in the same degree as a rightist government which would be largely dependent on British support. It may also have been felt that a leftist government would be less scrupulous in its treatment of the extensive British financial and economic interests in Greece.[1] It may also have concluded that civil strife, of the kind long traditional in Greece would be less likely with a rightist government, which might be expected to maintain order.

Apparently acting upon these assumptions, the British government has consistently supported rightist elements in the Greek political world, centering around the person of King George II, and has consistently opposed not only leftist but also moderate elements, which had opposed the rightist dictatorship of Metaxas and were prepared to resist the re-imposition of a rightist regime. In supporting the right, the British government has been brought into violent conflict with the largest, best organized, and most broadly-based political movement in Greece--the EAM, with its military arm the ELAS.[2]

The British decision to support the right was facilitated by the fact that the existing Greek government, which had gone into exile under British protection after the fall of Greece, was rightist in character. Hence British support of the right has been easily justified by the argument that the British were supporting not a political faction but the legally constituted authority of the Greek state. This argument has, however, been challenged by the Greek leftists, who hold that the King forfeited his own legal position as early as 1936 by abrogating the Greek constitution and setting up the Metaxas dictatorship.

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1. Cf. R & A Report No. 2686, "Political Implications of Greece's Foreign Indebtedness."
2. Cf. sec. II, B, 1, below.

More important than the arguments concerning the legality of the British position is the question of its political wisdom. This report suggests that the British government has misconceived the nature and relative strength of recent trends in Greek politics, and that its policy of supporting the right has been contrary to the best interests not only of Greece but ultimately of Great Britain itself. American intelligence over a period of years has made it clear (1) that the King's government has in fact not enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the Greek people, and (2) that no future government in Greece could aspire to stability unless it took full account of the widespread aspirations for democratic political, social, and economic reforms which now receive their most articulate expression in the EAM and its component parties and organizations. Failure to recognize these realities on the part of the British government has led directly to the present situation, in which the government of Great Britain has not only failed in its object of setting up a rightist regime but has forfeited much of the good will which the Greeks have traditionally felt for the British nation.

D. The Role of British Intelligence

British misconceptions with regard to the political temper of Greece and the strength of EAM may be attributed in considerable part to faulty intelligence, provided, contrary to the usual British practice, by personnel of uncertain qualifications and doubtful objectivity.[1] In the opinion of American observers such personnel, by inclination or perhaps because of briefing, have generally been hostile to EAM and disposed to underrate its strength and importance.

There is some reason to believe that the shortcomings of British intelligence personnel have been the result of deliberate policy rather than accident. Certain well-known British experts on Greek affairs are noticeably absent from the British services that are concerned

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1. Cf. Annex II.

with Greece. Furthermore, British authorities have betrayed some anxiety lest American observers portray the situation in Greece in a manner different from their own. They have complained that American liaison officers were too susceptible to EAM proselytizing, and have appeared particularly suspicious of Greek-speaking American representatives in Greece. In addition to maintaining a tight censorship on news dispatches from Cairo and Athens, British officials have sought to control the appointment of American newspaper correspondents for service in Greece.[1]

II. BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE GREEK RESISTANCE

A. General

When the Germans had occupied Greece and were using it as a principal supply route for their forces in North Africa, British policy with reference to the resistance in Greece was simple: the formation of resistance groups was encouraged, and maximum support was provided to any group which could harass German operations and disrupt German communications. Later, however, when the German danger in North Africa was past and Allied operations were directed to the situation in Greece itself, it became apparent that various resistance groups had widely disparate political programs and -- according to their respective opponents--were more concerned in implementing them than they were in expelling the invader. Distinctions of a political character were drawn between groups, and in the summer of 1943 British military and diplomatic authorities charged with the conduct of Greek affairs resolved to withdraw support from one group, the EAM, and to increase support of other groups, principally the EDES. As already noted, informed American opinion holds that this decision

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1. When this question came up at Cairo in August 1944 the British specifically stated that they wished no Greek-speaking American correspondents, and designated Mr. A. C. Sedgwick of the New York Times as a correspondent whose views were "acceptable."

was based on misconceptions as to the political temper and strength of the various organizations, attributable, at least in part, to faulty intelligence.[1]

B. Character and Orientation of the Greek Resistance Organizations

1. EAM-ELAS.

By far the largest and best organized resistance group, and the group whose resistance to the Germans has been most effective, is the EAM or "National Liberation Front," with its military arm, the ELAS or "National Popular Liberation Army." The EAM was formed early in the occupation by a combination of preexisting groups and parties. Of its component parts the Communists (KKE) were the closest knit and most experienced in underground activity by reason of their suppression under the Metaxas regime, and therefore took the lead in organizing and directing the work of EAM. But neither in the beginning nor later have the Communists been preponderant numerically (their present strength in EAM is estimated as being not over 20 percent); and as leaders from other parties grew in experience and stature, the Communists lost their monopoly of the direction. Party programs, indeed, have played a far smaller role in EAM propaganda than the notion of a liberated and independent Greece, which would be capable of initiating any desired social reforms by constitutional means. The Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), which was organized by the EAM in March 1944 for the specific purpose of promoting a unified government for Greece and may be regarded as the political arm of EAM, included in its central committee representatives of the spiritual and intellectual elite of Greece, members of the higher clergy and distinguished university professors. Contrary to the premises on thebasis of which the British government seems to have been operating, EAM appears to represent an actual majority of Greek opinion; it is not predominantly Communist; it is primarily

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1. Cf. R & A Report No. 1741, Resistance in Greece and its Relation to Allied Policy.

concerned with achieving a liberated and independent Greece, secondarily with internal reforms, and least of all with forcing Greece into an international position hostile to British interests.[1]

The numerical strength of EAM and its subsidiary organizations is hard to estimate. An American observer writing on 12 December 1944 stated that EAM would poll more votes than all the old parties put together.[2] A British estimate put its strength in the spring of 1943 at two million.[3] ELAS, the armed force of EAM, claimed to number 70,000 men and must have at least 50,000, for they put 25,000 into Athens, while holding practically all the rest of Greece (including Salonika) and operating successfully against EDES in Epirus. Their great strength in Macedonia seems not to have been tapped for the Athens operation. Of EAM's subsidiary organization for social service, women's work, etc., by far the most important for any present or future settlement of Greek political institutions is the youth organization called EPON, which numbers some half million enthusiastic members who have been indoctrinated with EAM "principles."

2. Rival Organizations.

a. EDES

A liberal political group called EDES was formed about 1934, with the approval, according to reports, of General Plastiras, now the Premier of Greece. The organization which operated under the same name in Epirus, however, had nothing in common with the original group, although Napoleon Zervas, present head of EDES, was connected with the organization in its early years.

Public utterances by Greek government and British authorities have referred to EDES and ELAS as "the resistance organization," with the implication that their strength as well as their general outlook

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1. Cf. Annex III.
2. R & A Athens Letter, 12 December 1944.
3. AFHQ, Balkan Political Review No. 20.

were comparable. Actually, however, the number of EDES troops has never exceeded 10,000 or 12,000, and the territory under their control has always been very small. The comparative weakness and instability of EDES was revealed when over two thirds of its forces deserted to ELAS between 23 and 25 December 1944. In this three-day campaign ELAS was able to eliminate EDES as a political and military factor in Greece.[1]

Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that EDES's resistance to the Germans has not been entirely effective--despite the fact that it has received much support from the British--while its conservative, nationalistic outlook and its hostility to EAM have been consistent. In 1942, according to a credible account, a British agent who had twice given Zervas money to operate a guerrilla band was able to induce Zervas to move only by threatening to inform the Germans that Zervas was in the pay of the British. EAM has consistently charged that EDES was more interested in attacking them than in fighting the Germans, and has alleged a number of instances in which EDES permitted the Germans free passage through territories they controlled in order to enable them to attack ELAS. EDES, in turn, charged that EAM was ready to betray the interests of Greece at the behest of international Communism, and circulated documents (subsequently proven to be forgeries) to support the charge.

A number of clashes occurred between EDES and ELAS after the British had begun supporting EDES in preference to ELAS in the fall of 1943; these clashes were interrupted but not ended by an agreement signed under British auspices at Plaka on 29 February 1944. In the summer of 1944 Zervas acknowledged the authority of the Greek government and declared that he would act only according to government orders. Nevertheless, it was reported subsequently that German withdrawals from Greece (for example, from Arta), were covered by EDES forces.

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1. New York Times, 23-25 December 1944.

b. EKKA

The political orientation of this small resistance group was very like that of EDES. Friction between EKKA and ELAS resulted in a violent encounter on 17 April 1944 in which Colonel Psaros, the leader of EKKA, was killed, and as a result of which EKKA disbanded. The fact that the majority of disbanded EKKA men promptly joined the quisling Security Battalions served to corroborate EAM's assertions that EKKA was more hostile to ELAS than to the Germans, and was not above abetting German operations against ELAS. It should be noted that Kartalis, EKKA's political leader, was a member of Papandreou's original cabinet and has continued in the Greek government, and that Colonel Psaros was posthumously elevated to the rank of general by the Plastiras government.

c. The Khi Organization

This organization, whose hositility was directed almost exclusively against EAM, was formed by royalist senior officers with Metaxist connections and later joined by active junior officers and civilians. According to its leader, Colonel Grivas, Khi is a military organization without professed political aims, but is avowedly hostile to Communists and believes the King can contribute to the good of the country. Its slogan was "Kill every EAMite at sight."

Khi was originally armed by the Germans and worked openly with them, in particular with the SS. All of its members were equipped with identity cards furnished by the quisling Special Security organization. Their equipment was supplemented from funds contributed by groups surrounding the King.

According to Colonel Grivas, the Khi organization's first contact with the Allies was in November 1943, when it combined with EDES and RAN (Ventiris's chauvinist and royalist officer organization)[1] to form an anti-Communist body. This body met with a British mission officer and signed an undertaking, in addition to carrying on activity against the

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1. Cf. sec. d, (1), below.

Germans, to (1) protect Athens between the evacuation of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies, (2) put all of its forces at the disposal of the Allies, and (3) obey the orders of Allied headquarters. Subsequently Khi received arms and ammunition from the British, but its armed strength has never been estimated to exceed 3,000.

d. Minor organizations

A number of lesser organizations have received encouragement from adherents of the royalist cause, and have participated in efforts to suppress the EAM. Among them are:

(1) RAN. This is a royalist and chauvinist organization which capitalizes upon its agitation for the satisfaction of Greece's territorial claims. Its name is variously reported to be composed of the initial letters of Roumelia, Albania, Nisia (islands); or Rilos (in Bulgaria), Avlon (Valona, in southern Albania), Nisia; or Rilos, Avlon, Nike (victory). RAN was in a sense the personal organization of Colonel Ventiris, well known as a royalist, and until recently Chief of Staff of the Greek army. The RAN group has been encouraged and favored by the British.

(2) PAO. This is an organization of royalist and Metaxist officers in Macedonia, formed for the stated purpose of preventing radicals from gaining control when the Germans withdrew. It discouraged resistance to the Germans as useless, and was almost stamped out by EAM in consequence. Subsequently it openly collaborated wih the Germans in operations against EAM. PAO served the Germans as a model for the quisling Security Battalions,[1] and they sponsored a PAO organization in Evros. When the Germans evacuated Salonika groups of PAO accompanied them and threatened that they would return in triumph.

(3) The Quisling Security Battalions. The complete subservience to the Germans of the quisling Security Battalions in Greece has been amply demonstrated to the satisfaction of Americans if not the satisfaction of the British. It is known, however, that these formations also had

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1. Cf. sec C, below.

contact with EDES, PAO, and other "nationalist" groups, and also with the British (whose support they publicly claimed) and with the British-supported Papandreou government.[1] A chief point of dissent between the EAM representatives in the Middle East and Papandreou was EAM's insistence that the Security Battalions be publicly condemned, and Papandreou's refusal to do so.

C. British Relations with EAM-ELAS

1. Withdrawal of Support.

As already noted, British authorities determined in the autumn of 1943 to withdraw their support from EAM-ELAS and to transfer it to other organizations. In order to safeguard their personnel in ELAS-dominated regions the British resolved to make this withdrawal of support gradual, and established a policy of supplying no new weapons but only replacing ammunition spent upon inventory. ELAS alleges that important operations against the Germans were frustrated by British failure to deliver munitions at crucial moments, that ELAS suffered unnecessary personnel losses, and that bitter feelings were aroused against the British.[2] British liaison officers, on the other hand, complained (despite the ill-concealed British hostility to EAM, which included overt aid to its enemies) that ELAS officers did not show a sufficiently cooperative spirit.

Politically, also, it became evident that it was a systematic policy of Mr. Leeper, the British Ambassador, and of Papandreou when he became premier, to weaken EAM and influence public opinion against it. During the Lebanon conference of May 1944, which met with the object of forming a government of national unity,[3] part of the misunderstanding

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1. R & A Report No. 2165, The Greek Security Battalions. Security Battalion recruiting officers in public speeches during the summer of 1944 said such things as "The arms and uniforms we give you are supplied by the Germans, but the British want these battalions to be organized." Dertilis, the commanding officer of the Security Battalions, was arrested by the Germans on the evidence of a German agent in Cairo, who alleged that he was in communication with the British. Cairo Weekly Greek Intelligence Summary, No. 16, 17 June 1944.
2. Cf. Annex IV.
3. Cf. sec. III, B, below.

betwwen the EAM representatives in the Middle East and their principals in Greece may in part have been due to incomplete and delayed transmission of cables from Greece. The fact that the British were in control of communications facilities has led EAM to place the blame upon them. The British, however, ascribed to EAM obstructionism the delays in completing the cabinet, and construed compromises which the leftists were constrained to make as more yielding than they in fact were. When EAM leaders protested and delayed compliance they were portrayed as ambitious demagogues intent on enhancing their own position.

The British used severe censorship restrictions to prevent favorable comment on EAM from reaching the outside world, and at the same time promoted dissemination of anti-EAM material. Papandreou broadcast attacks on EAM on several occasions, once on the very day when Ambassador Leeper had arranged for a British and an American officer of known anti-EAM views to address press correspondents on the situation in Greece.[1]

2. Support of Rival Organizations.

The British hostility to EAM appeared more concretely in their support of anti-EAM "resistance" organizations and in their recruiting of "reliable" troops outside Greece for special duties. In seeking to check the power and influence of EAM the British have employed as many Greek formations as possible. As soon as it became apparent that EAM would make a bid for a considerable voice in Greek political affairs, the British began to encourage and recruit groups that would oppose them, then or later. Some measure of British support and encouragement was extended to all of the non-EAM organizations mentioned above,[2] not excluding the quisling Security Battalions. Of these groups only EDES was publicized, and the erroneous impression was created that the strength of EDES was equal to that of ELAS.

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1. This particular interview was cancelled because the American was advised by his superiors not to give the address.
2. Cf. sec. B, 2, above.

In addition, British military authorities in the Middle East recruited special Greek units which were formally part of the Greek national army but were selected for their pro-royalist and anti-EAM orientation. The best known of these formations is the so-called Mountain Brigade, which was formed in theLebanon after the mutinies of April 1944.[1] Some four thousand men whose political records had been carefully scrutinized were put into training under exclusively royalist Greek officers with British supervision. During August 1944 the Mountain Brigade disembarked in Italy, singing Metaxist songs, and fought together with Allied forces at Rimini. Early in November it was landed in the Piraeus. It was universally anticipated that these troops would be used to combat EAM, (which in the event, they did) and their presence in Greece was one of the main factors in precipitating the final crisis over EAM-ELAS's refusal to disarm.[2]

III. BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

A. Controversial Status of the Exiled Government

The British government and its agents have closely supervised Greek political affairs since the spring of 1941, when, after their assistance to the Greek Government in fighting the Germans, they helped it in its withdrawal from Greece and its establishment as a government in exile. Shortly after this date it became apparent that divergences between the predominantly rightist Greek government and popular opinion in Greece were increasing, and that the degree to which the government (already unpopular by virtue of its association with the Metaxas dictatorship) could be said to represent Greece was diminishing.

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1. Cf. sec. II, C, 2, above.
2. Another Greek unit which achieved considerable notoriety was the so-called Sacred Company, a group of Greek officers who served as private soldiers and were used as adjuncts to British commando units, under British officers, for raids on the islands of the eastern Mediterranean. Whether by accident or otherwise, the personnel of this group was largely royalist and particularly attached to the British point of view.

Greek politics throughout the period of German occupation and up to the present have centered about efforts to broaden the base of this Greek government. These efforts have usually been initiated by the resistance movements within Greece, especially by the EAM, and have regularly been opposed by the government itself, usually on the direct advice of the British.

The differences between the British and opinion in Greece are exemplified by the question of the King's return--a minor issue in itself, but one which has attained extraordinary symbolic importance. Greek liberals have come to associate the King with the "fascist" evils exemplified by the Metaxas dictatorship, for which they hold him responsible, and with foreign influence upon internal Greek affairs. The underground and leftist press never refers to him otherwise than as "Glucksburg," as if to underscore his non-Greek derivation and associations. The abdication of the King has become a cardinal article in the leftist program, and the liberals have repeatedly asked that the King agree not to return to Greece unless anduntil summoned by a plebiscite under impartial supervision. The King, who has been in close touch with the British government at all times, has regularly replied by some equivocation, until, after his Christmas 1944 visit to Athens, Mr. Churchill prevailed upon the King to appoint Archbishop Damaskinos regent.

The issue of the King's return has split the Greek community throughout the world into two bitterly hostile camps, of which the anti-royalist faction has always appeared to be the larger and the more representative of Greek sentiment. Friction has been particularly acute in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East, and a number of mutinies have been carried on by the predominantly republican rank and file in protest against the political tendencies of their royalist officers and of the British, who held supreme command in the Middle East theater.

These issues were crystallized in the summer of 1943, when a delegation of six representatives of resistance organizations in Greece

(EDES and EKKA as well as EAM) came to Cairo to discuss broadening the base of the government. These delegates were dismissed and summarily returned to Greece by the British.

By the fall of 1943, when the decision was taken by the British to withdraw support from EAM and to support rival bodies, they apprehended that leftist sentiments had infected the Greek armed forces in the Middle East to such an extent as to make them "unreliable." At least partly for this reason they refused to employ Greek formations in the abortive attempt to occupy the Dodecanese following the surrender of Italy. In January 1944 Vice Premier Roussos resigned in protest against Premier Tsouderos's failure to implement an agreement to procure from the King an unequivocal statement on the "constitutional" question. In February a delegation of fourteen senior officers of the armed forces presented a petition for broadening the base of the government; after the customary consultation with Mr. Leeper, the British Ambassador, as many of the petitioners as could be found were arrested.

B. The Mutinies and the Crisis of April-May 1944[1]

Incipient disturbances in the armed forces precipitated a crisis in early April 1944, which resulted in the fall of the Tsouderos government which had been in office ever since 1941. For a short period the Liberal Venizelos, who is, however, frequently described as weak, was Premier, but was virtually dismissed by the British Ambassador. To replace Venizelos the British brought out from Greece George Papandreou, whom King George appointed Prime Minister on 23 April. Papandreou had been a very minor political figure, with a negligible following. He had not participated in resistance movements in Greece, and was charged by his leftist opponents with having maintained contacts with quisling politicians. In Cairo it was said by his enemies that he had been "sold" to the British by his secretary Vassiliades, who had been in British employ.

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1. Cf. R & A Report No. 2125, "The Greek Crisis of April-May 1944."

During the political crisis the Greek army and navy forces in Egypt mutinied. The men (most of them veterans of the Albanian campaign) protested that they were eager to fight against the Germans, but insisted that the course of events had given them reason to suspect that the British intended to employ them against liberals in Greece. The men of the airforce (who also had a liberal organization) did not join in the mutiny because they trusted the liberal sentiments of their officers. The mutineers were disarmed with British assistance, and the vessels of which they had taken possession recovered. Some ten thousand were put into concentration camps. At the subsequent courts martial of the leaders, held at Qassassin and Alexandria in July and August, the point was made that the usages of the Greek army had never precluded political activity on the part of its members, and that the practise of political movements being initiated in the army had grown so traditional as to give it a certain legitimacy. Testimony presented at the trials left certain political personages under a cloud, among them Venizelos and Karapanayotis, former secretaries of war and navy respectively. Karapanayotis had already been exiled to Eritrea.

C. The Lebanon Conference

Events had made clear both the impotence of the Cairo government and its failure to represent more than a fraction of Greek opinion. In Greece the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) was organized by EAM in March 1944 for the avowed purpose of promoting the achievement of a government which should truly represent all parties in Greece. Consequently Venizelos, with British approval, had convoked a conference of representatives of all political parties in Greece to meet in the Lebanon during May for the purpose of forming a unity government. The conference closed in an atmosphere of harmony, and all issues were reported settled. But after the close of the conference disagreements so serious appeared that the unity government which the conference had envisaged was not completed for three months.

Leftist delegates in Cairo insisted that they had made every possible concession at the conference, in the belief that their opponents (the rightists and the British) were motivated by an equally genuine desire for a fair and patriotic solution. They charged, however, that their own concessions had been exploited far beyond their original intent, and that their opponents had disregarded the obligations they themselves had entered upon. It had been understood, for instance (but not stipulated, for reasons of courtesy), that Papandreou should relinquish the premiership, that political attacks on EAM should cease, that ELAS should be recognized as the national army, that the Security Battalions should be condemned, and that EAM should receive a certain number of portfolios in a cabinet whose total strength was to be limited. None of these expectations was realized.

The leftists blamed the failure to attain harmony on the hostility of Mr. Leeper, whose manipulations during and after the conference were conspicuous. Indeed Mr. Leeper's interference had become so active that even Greek conservatives began to resent it.[1] One instance which was particularly shocking to all Greek opinion was the treatment accorded to the universally respected publicist Lambriakis, who had always been an ardent Anglophile, when he attempted to attend the Lebanon conference.

D. The Position of Papandreou

The charge of complete subservience to the British, made against Papandreou as early as the period of the Lebanon Conference, was supported on numerous later occasions. Papandreou often issued decisions purporting to be based on cabinet action and in fact deriving only from instructions given by Mr. Leeper, or more recently by General Scobie. Decisions which have been taken in consultation with the cabinet have been summarily abrogated by Papandreou upon orders of the British.[2]

Distrust of Papandreou was apparently the sole hindrance to the formation of the unity government during July. On 3 August the Committee

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1. Cf. Annex IV.
2. Cf. Annex V.

in the mountains (PEEA) made Papandreou's resignation their sole condition for entering the government. Mr. Leeper, however, instructed Papandreou not to resign; and, though in the cabinet meeting held to discuss the question on 5 August three members urged his resignation, the press release covering the meeting stated that the cabinet had unanimously voted to ask him to continue as premier.[1]

Papandreou's treatment of his cabinet is further illustrated by his failure to inform any of them when he departed to consult with Mr. Churchill in the latter half of August. This convinced three of the ministers that it was impossible to cooperate with Papandreou, and they resigned.

E. The Government of National Unity

At the end of August 1944, upon Mr. Churchill's suggestion, the Greek Government moved from Cairo to Italy in order to be near the military authorities and in a better position to move into Greece as soon as it should be liberated. A contributory reason was the desire to permit the Government to operate in an atmosphere free of the intrigue rife in Cairo. Early in September six leftist ministers (including two Communists) finally joined the government, in which they were outnumbered by more than two to one. Nevertheless, measures to prevent accessions to EAM strength within Greece and to strengthen EAM's opponents continued, and actions by Mr. Leeper became more overt.

Currency and victualling were the principal problems which faced the government when it returned to Athens in October, and the cooperation of the leftist ministers in efforts to solve these problems was wholehearted. Some criticism was levelled at Porfirogenis, the Communist Minister of Labor, for over-generous treatment of workers' demands, and extreme rightists charged that Papandreou was yielding too much ground to the leftists; but the governmental representatives of the left wing parties repeatedly asserted their unqualified adherence to the policies of the government, and appealed to their following to

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1. Cairo Weekly Greek Intelligence Summary #25, 9 August 1944.

give full support to the government. Differences were accentuated, however, when the government, far from heeding leftist demands for prompt punishment of collaborationists, proceeded to place them in high positions, to bring in rightist military groups from Italy, and to enroll Security Battalion personnel in rightist military units.[1] The issue was brought to a head with the order that ELAS disband and disarm.

IV. BRITISH POLICY SINCE THE LIBERATION OF GREECE

A. Nature of the British Position in Greece

When the British arrived in Greece in October 1944, with a force numbering only a few hundreds, they found practically the entire country under the control of ELAS, which facilitated their progress through the northern Peloponnese and welcomed them into Athens. At first the British were warmly welcomed by all classes of the population. Within a few weeks, however, after the Germans had withdrawn and when it was becoming increasingly apparent that the British intended to exert their influence on the development of Greek internal politics, this favorable attitude had become far from universal. On 20 November an American observer in Athens reported: "The right acclaims them /the British/ as the liberators of Greece, bringers of food, bulwarks against Communism and forerunners of the King. The left asks whether this is not another foreign occupation with the occupying force manipulating the internal politics of Greece as much as the Germans did; why do the liberators not liberate Crete; why are the British releasing collaborators and arming them; and where is the food?"[2]

The legal basis for the continued presence of British armed forces in Greece since the withdrawal of the Germans has not been entirely clear, and has been questioned by the left on several occasions. Before the German evacuation, Greek resistance leaders had met with

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1. Cf. sec. IV, B, below.
2. OSS, R & A Athens, 20 November 1944; confirmed by private intelligence.

British military authorities at Caserta and agreed to accept General Scobie as Allied commander-in-chief in Greece. A clause in the original draft of the agreement to the effect that part of General Scobie's function would be the restoration of law and order was struck out in the final signed draft upon the insistence of the EAM representatives, who thus refused to acknowledge General Scobie's authority in internal Greek affairs.[1] At the end of November General Scobie declared that the refusal of ELAS commander-in-chief General Sarafis to obey his order to disband ELAS constituted insubordination, and in a press conference on 5 December Scobie defined his attitude toward ELAS as that of a commander toward mutinous troops. General Sarafis, on the contrary, has maintained that he had accepted Scobie's command for operations against the Germans, but could not recognize his authority in internal Greek affairs. Leftist spokesmen have alleged that one reason for the failure of the British forces to take any steps toward liberating Crete is the need to maintain the fiction that the war is still progressing in Greek territory.

Greek opinion has failed to accept British official explanations of their continued presence in Greece. As stated by General Scobie on 1 December, the British have three objectives in Greece: (1) to clear Greece of enemy forces; (2) to bring and distribute supplies; and (3) to help the Greek people restore their prosperity by establishing the authority of the lawful government throughout the country. The first of these aims has been achieved. In regard to the second, the Greeks claim (and Americans are inclined to support the claim) that if UNRRA had been freed from the jurisdiction of British Military Liaison, it would have been able to carry out its mandate fully and with perfect safety, with the cooperation of Greeks of all parties.

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1. Statement of Mr. Cocks in Commons 18 January 1945 (Hansard, 474). The statement (unlike others made by the Opposition) has not been refuted.

The third aim seems to the Greeks disingenuous in view of the government's lack of any convincing claim to enjoy the allegiance of the Greek people. EAM's position with reference to government was that King George forfeited his position by acting unconstitutionally in authorizing the dictatorship in 1936, and that the government had lost whatever legal right it may have had by acting contrary to the interests of the nation and the will of a majority of the people. Since the creation of the regency and the appointment of General Plastiras as premier, arguments based upon thealleged British intention to restore the king have fallen to the ground, and EAM has lost such of its adherents whose participation was based upon opposition to the monarchy. But for many the issue of the monarchy was only a convenient designation for opposition to authoritarian government supported by external force. Such opinion is equally apprehensive of Plastiras, who has proved even more adamant than his predecessor in insisting upon disbanding and disarming ELAS, not admitting EAM or Communist representatives to the cabinet, and maintaining the government position by the use of armed force and reliance upon British support. Leftist opinion persists in questioning the British explanation of their presence in Greece, and maintains that the British have sought to destroy the influence of EAM and support a dictatorship.

B. Support of Anti-ELAS ORGANIZATIONS

In order to counterbalance the military strength of ELAS, the British gave continued encouragement to the various rightist organizations described above,[1] connived at the release from prison of Security Battalion officers and other "collaborationists" whom ELAS had jailed and intended to try, and brought in from Italy the rightist Mountain Brigade.[2] The British commander was instructed to control the situation

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1. Cf. sec. II, B, 2.
2. Cf. Annex VII.

as far as possible by using Greek units. But it was obvious that even with additions to the rightist forces ELAS would easily have the upper hand in a show of strength. Hence, the British brought in reinforcements of their own.

C. Negotiations Concerning the Dissolution of ELAS[1]

The leftists had acquiesced in a cabinet representation of six (of whom only two were Communists), or less than one third of the portfolios, although American observers have stated they could poll more votes than all other parties combined. It was evident that they could not be weakened unless their armed force, ELAS, were disarmed and disbanded. Accordingly, though it had been agreed at the Lebanon conference that ELAS forces would be incorporated into a new national army, steps were initiated looking towards their disbandment and disarmament.

The Papandreou-British justification of this decision is simple and understandable: the legal and officially recognized government could scarecly be considered a national government in the true sense so long as the ELAS remained the strongest military force in the country. This position was acceptable to EAM-ELAS as well. EAM-ELAS insisted, however, that it could not be required to disarm unless steps were taken simultaneously to neutralize its armed opponents and to guarantee the fulfillment of its political demands (see below).

On 10 November Premier Papandreou, after a visit to General Scobie but without consulting the EAM members of his cabinet, announced that the guerrilla bands (EDES and ELAS) should be disbanded by 10 December. EAM-ELAS agreed to the disbandment order on the conditions that (1) all the rightist armed groups (Mountain Brigade, Sacred Company, RAN, and Khi) be dissolved together with ELAS and EDES, and (2) that a plebiscite be held by February 1945.

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1. Cf. R & A Report No. 2752, The Greek Political Crisis.

Papandreou and the British have consistently taken the position that EAM insistence on the dissolution of the Mountain Brigade as well as the ELAS was unacceptable, because whereas the ELAS is a "private" guerrilla body, the Mountain Brigade is an official, integral unit of the Allied forces. Although this contention is technically correct, EAM maintains that the history and actions of the Mountain Brigade show that it is fully as partisan as ELAS and has probably less claim to being a representative national force,[1] Consequently the issue was far more than simply a legal question of private versus national armies.

The situation was further complicated by the active aid extended by the British not only to the Mountain Brigade but also to unofficial, "private" rightist bands such as Khi and RAN. EAM's insistence on the dissolution of the rightist bands was due not only to the well-known royalist proclivities of these groups but especially to the support and encouragement extended to them by the British[2] and the simultaneous manifestation of provocatively anti-EAM policies and activities by General Scobie. It is known that throughout this period General Scobie treated the EAM ministers in a manner which can only be described as exceedingly high-handed, holding them responsible for all lawless acts, refusing to listen to their remonstrances, vainly demanding that they sign a secret declaration accepting responsibility for such acts, and intimating that he would favor a change in the government if his demands were not met within a given time limit. An American representative in Athens concluded that General Scobie was "ardently and openly anti-EAM...would like nothing better than to cause the disruption of the organization...and is developing the habit of presenting the Greek government with faits accomplis." As an example of the latter tendency the observer reported that Scobie

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1. Cf. sec. II, C, 2, above.
2. R & A No. 1175.89, 9 December 1944.

without having consulted Papandreou, had announced that they both had agreed to station British troops all over Greece before Papandreou had time to consider the matter fully.[1]

Prime Minister Churchill and other British spokesmen have asserted that armed British intervention in Greece became necessary in order to frustrate "an attempt to impose by violence a Communist dictatorship without the people being able to express their wishes." It is true that during November British intelligence claimed to have knowledge of an EAM or Communist plot to seize power in Greece through an armed coup before the planned demobilization could be carried through; but there has been no independent confirmation of these claims, and circumstances make it appear most unlikely that they have any basis in fact. It is noteworthy that only two of the EAM ministers who resigned from the cabinet at the beginning of December were Communists, and the fact that five non-Communists joined them suggest that the question involved was not domination by a single party buta broader national issue. It would also be reasonable to assume that, if the EAM-ELAS had harbored dictatorial designs, it would have acted early in October when the Germans were evacuating Greece and the British had not yet arrived in force, rather than waiting for considerable British units to be dispatched to the principal cities of the country.

D. Civil War and Attempts at Compromise

Despite prolonged negotiations, at the end of November no satisfactory agreement had been reached over the fulfillment of EAM's conditions.(dissolution of the rightist groups and holding of a plebiscite). Although the details of the ensuing cabinet crisis are still not entirely clear,[2] it is evident that it was precipitated by a proclamation of General Scobie, acting in accordance with

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1. OSS, R&A Athens, 20 November 1944.
2. Cf. R & A Report No. 2752, The Greek Political Crisis.

instructions from Prime Minister Churchill, ordering the disbandment of ELAS and EDES and promising to support the Papandreou government and repel any attempt at using force.

Following the resignation of the six EAM members of the cabinet on 1-2 December, in protest against what they termed the "unilateral decisions" of General Scobie, EAM adherents staged a mass meeting at Athens on 3 December. The demonstration, dispersed with numerous casualties by the Greek police, was the prelude to full-scale warfare between the ELAS and Greek government and British forces.

During the earlier stages of the fighting more than one attempt to secure a truce or compromise solution and end the civil strife was frustrated by the refusal of the British government to modify its position. On 4 December Papandreou decided to resign because of the increasing disorders, and asked the octogenarian Liberal Party leader, Themistocles Sophoulis, to form a new government. All political parties agreed to support Sophoulis, but on 5 December it became known that the British government in London had refused to approve any change in the premiership. According to a statement by Sophoulis, General Scobie called and asked him to give his support to Papandreou, whereupon Sophoulis replied that to do so would be to support a dictatorship.[1]

On 12 December Mr. Harold Macmillan, British Resident Minister in the Middle East, and Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, arrived at Athens to inspect the situation and find a solution for the impasse. For a week following their arrival fragmentary reports mentioned negotiations between the British and ELAS representatives. As far as can be judged, the British continued to insist that ELAS must evacuate Attica before negotiations could proceed, while ELAS insisted that a coalition government must be formed before they evacuated.

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1. FCC: Ticker, 6 December 1944; National Herald, 7 December 1944.

A significant modification of the British position followed the arrival of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden in Athens on 25 December. While fighting between ELAS and British forces continued, the two British statesmen appear to have become convinced that no solution was possible without a change in the status of the King. Before leaving Athens it was announced that the British leaders would advise the King to appoint a regent, and on the last day of 1944, while fighting still was going on, Archbishop Damaskinos was sworn in as Regent and accepted the resignation of Papandreou as Prime Minister.

The creation of the Regency served to meet the objections of those who opposed British operations in Greece on the ground that they were calculated to restore the king, but the move did not affect apparent British determination to guide Greek policy. Both Archbishop Damaskinos and Prime Minister Plastiras asserted that whatever grounds EAM had had for fighting were now removed by the establishment of the regency and their own promises of restoration of democratic procedures. But Plastiras, whose closest advisers (for example, Gonatas) had been charged with collaboration with the Germans, denounced ELAS as traitorous rebels and threatened their leaders with criminal prosecution; and declared himself uncompromisingly opposed to Communism. Fighting therefore continued until the truce entered into between General Scobie and ELAS on 11 January opened the way for a definitive settlement. By the terms of the truce ELAS evacuated most of the eastern seaboard, including Athens and Salonika, the northern Peloponnese, and most of the islands. In the face of increasing British and diminishing ELAS strength, which greatly reduced EAM hopes of eventual success, of extreme war weariness accentuated by food shortages, and the hopes of a just solution implicit in creation of the regency, moderates began to dissociate themselves from EAM. The defection of large groups such as the socialist ELD and SKE were reported.

Nevertheless, as late as 20 January an American observer characterized these defections as "splinters of splinters" and reported that EAM's strength was basically not affected. Not only premature and exaggerated reports of defections but other devices were employed to convey an impression of wide-spread Greek hostility towards EAM, and thus actually to hasten the process of disintegration. A great rightist demonstration was held in Constitution Square on 14 January but observers questioned its spontaneity. Labor delegations thanked the British for liberating Athens and the Piraeus from ELAS, but it later developed that the leaders of these delegations were known Metaxists, and that the men they attacked as members of EAM were reputable labor leaders. Pressure was brought to bear upon the non-Communist leaders of EAM (but without success) to denounce the organization as purely Communist, and all official utterances were predicated upon the assumption that EAM and Communism were identical, an assumption which actually promoted the realization of such identity.

That the assumption went beyond the facts was illustrated by the negotiations between EAM and the government concerning the composition of the EAM delegation to conclude a settlement with the government during the first days of February. The government insisted that the three man delegation must be exclusively Communist, on the grounds that EAM was only a front for the Communist organization, and demanded that Ilias Tsirimokos who represented ELD (and so all the moderate elements in EAM) should either withdraw or declare himself a Communist. Since Tsirimokos has long been known to be antipathetic to Communism, the request for such a declaration could only have meant that the government used the term Communist to designate all those who were opposed to it. Communications from the EAM Central Committee, as for example their appeal to the Allied governments to modify the one-sided intervention of the British dated 17 January, continued to bear the signatures of representatives of EAM's various component organizations.

Supported by British determination and British resources victory for the government is assured; and each new government success serves further to discredit EAM. But some of the aspersions cast upon EAM are so manifestly unjust, and the withholding of food supplies has worked such hardships that a residue of distrust and hatred for the British and their proteges is likely to persist and to require further repression. Even moderates have resented as calumnies upon the Greek people the charge that EAM did not offer effective resistance against the Germans. Reports indicate that the Government has arrested and maltreated hostages in the same fashion as ELAS, perhaps without the knowledge of the British, but in reliance upon British support of their cause. Though this side of the story has not been publicized, it is known in Greece, will doubtless be exploited by an underground press, and will surely not be soon forgotten.

V. CONCLUSION

A. Immediate Prospects

EAM's power has declined and its reputation has suffered. Many moderate supporters, who feel that their prime objectives (avoidance of the resurgence of a dictatorship of the Metaxas type) have been assured by the Regency and that the most objectionable of the collaborators have been eliminated in the course of the fighting, have dissociated themselves from EAM, but it is difficult to know the extent of EAM's decline in numbers or the degree to which the conversion of regenerate EAMites will survive renewed strain. The government has not yet attacked the fundamental causes which made EAM's growth possible, and though EAM yields under pressure to a government-dictated agreement, the possibilities of renewed hostility will require that the government exercise a firmness of which it will not be capable without British assistance.

On the other hand, the British are now too deeply committed to withdraw until the country is completely pacified. Their problem is to find a means whereby the Greek government may be able to conciliate

and win the cooperation of the elements at present dissident, and thereby to regain the good will of the mass of public opinion which may have been alienated by the manner and methods of British intervention in thepast. The present government, or at least its prime minister, does not seem inclined towards conciliation; indeed, as long as the government remains appointive and EAM representatives are excluded there must remain a section of the population which will claim that its views are not given adequate expression. It would seem to be Britain's obligation to exercise restraint upon Plastiras' tendencies to wilfulness, to encourage conciliatory measures calculated to restore EAM members to the body politic, and to promote the early carrying out of the promised plebiscite, the prospect of which government spokesmen thus far have relegated to the remote future.

B. Results of British Policy So Far

The most paradoxical feature of the present situation is that current British policy far from promoting recognized British interests in Greece, is in fact at this time alienating the traditional pro-British sentiments of the Greek people. It has already led the conservative, Anglophile, anti-EAM Liberal Party leader, Sophoulis, to protest: "I am a friend of England but not a slave." In the minds of many Greeksit is apparently justifying EAM's claims to be defending Greek national interest and independence against foreign interference, although the continuance of this anti-British feeling rests to a large part upon the future turn of events. Many who absolve the British of the EAM charge of wilfully causing bloodshed still hold the British responsible for not preventing it by the exercise of judicious precautions. The British government may have achieved its end--a safe and friendly government in Greece--for with the help of the Regency and anti-EAM liberal elements the Plastiras Government may establish itself upon a firmer basis. To a large proportion of a war-weary population, sadly in need of food and supplies, the restoration of law and order, even with British intervention, may

be preferable to renewed civil war against heavy odds, particularly if the present Greek Government should pursue a moderate course and prove fairly efficient.

In Britain, from the Government's point of view, the results of the Greek policy have been unfortunate, as is apparent from Churchill's most recent speech. On 18 January 1945 Churchill said: "....there is no case in my experience, certainly not in my wartime experience, where a British Government has been so maligned and its motives so traduced in our own country by important organs of the press or among our own people. That this should be done amid the perils of the war, now at its climax, has filled me with surprise and sorrow.... How can we wonder at, still less how can we complain, of the attitude of hostile or indifferent newspapers in the United States when we have in this country witnessed such a melancholy exhibition as that provided by some of our most time-honored and responsible journals and others to which that epithet would hardly apply."[1] More significant than his expressions of regret were his warnings that such criticism might weaken the British diplomatic position. Such criticism, he said, "bodes ill for the future in which the life and strength of Britain, compared to other powers, will be tested to the full, not only in the war but in the aftermath...." and "....I would warn the House that if we are going to tear ourselves asunder in this island over all the feuds and passions of the Balkan countries which our armies and Allies have liberated we shall be found quite incapable of making our influence felt in the great settlement which awaits us...."[2] It seems evident that Churchill is not unaware of the possibility that the British policy in Greece may be confronted by strong American and/or Russian opposition.

It is questionable whether Churchill's description of his Greek opposition as "Trotskyism" will solve the problem of British opposition

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1. Washington Post, 19 January 1945.
2. Ibid.

to the Greek Communists and Left-wingers. Although the Soviet Union has maintained a strictly "correct" hands-off policy during the current crisis, there is no doubt on which side lie Russian official and unofficial sympathies. Furthermore, Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory Popov, Chief of the Soviet Military Mission in Greece, has been moved to protest to General Scobie against numerous anti-Soviet manifestations in areas controlled by English forces. Despite Churchill's assurances that the British were in Greece with Russian consent, critics of his policy have become increasingly uneasy about the ultimate implications of his policy. The outspoken Tribune, Aneurin Bevan's paper, wrote on 22 December 1944:

> .....The first to exploit this evident malaise among the popular parties in Europe (which generally means the Left and Liberals) has not been Rundstedt, but reactionary Toryism led by the Prime Minister; Mr. Churchill's dislike, hatred, and fear of what he calls Communist dictatorship has led him to propose and condone action the consequences of which he does not seem to be fully aware. There are many men in Mr. Churchill's Party who share his sentiments about Communism but whose stake in the capitalist system with which Mr. Churchill and the Tories are so concerned is less romantic and more real than Churchill's.... Their main preoccupation for some time has been not with what Germany might still do, but with what Russia is doing in the Balkans and the Baltic and possibly also in central Europe and even France. This is no assumption on our part. It is an open secret for anyone who knows what is going on in certain Tory circles.... The danger now is that victory itself has become endangered by the policy pursued by Churchill in Greece and Belgium, and by Stalin in Poland....

The results of British policy so far point to the conclusion that the British Government in its determination to maintain its traditional position in Greece runs the risk of antagonizing the Soviet Union as well as leftist elements throughout Europe.

The American reaction to the British policy has been loud and confused. The anti-British isolationist press has seized the opportunity to inveigh against Britain's "traditional" selfishness. The Hearst press, also anti-British, has applauded Britain's stand against the "Red menace." American leftists, already anti-Churchill if not anti-British, have joined British critics in their outcry against Churchill's "Toryism." The thoughtful section of the American press

has been equally disturbed by the British policy and the possible effect upon Anglo-American relations. On both sides of the Atlantic the Greek situation has been an important factor in the recent flare-up of the Anglo-American press.

C. Alternative Lines of Action

Persistence in the present British policy, if Great Britain is prepared to divert the necessary armed force from other battle fronts, could certainly result in ultimate success against the ELAS--but the events of December 1944 have made it clear that such success could be achieved only at a heavy military, political, and moral cost. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that it would be to the long-run advantage of Great Britain itself, as well as of the Greeks and the United Nations, to accept and encourage a popularly-supported Greek government (which must include a substantial number of EAM ministers, including Communists), rather than to attempt to support a controlled government which has virtually no roots in the country and would inevitably prove unpopular and difficult to maintain.

ANNEX I. THE BRITISH VIEW OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S GREEK POLICY

A. The Conservative Attitude

On 19 December 1944 Churchill said, "There is, of course, a sharp division of opinion in the country on the position /of the British Government/ not only in Greece but in other countries and that division naturally causes heart-searching and sharp criticisms...." [1] Nowhere have the heart-searching and sharp criticisms been more acute than in Britain, and the division of opinion within the country as reflected by press and in Parliament closely parallels the political division of the country into Conservatives and Labour-Liberals. Since Churchill and Eden are Conservatives, the Government's policy in Greece is to a considerable degree a Conservative policy, and its staunchest defenders have been the Conservative M.P.s and the Conservative press.

It is not possible to consider the policy followed by the British Government in Greece in isolation from the political situation within Britain herself. Within England as elsewhere the Conservatives defend democracy based on the traditional western lines of political equality, while the liberals and left-wingers, with an eye to a large measure of social and economic equality, advocate a democracy in which the State should play a larger part in the regulation of the economic and social aspects of life. The policy which resulted in the forty days' civil war in Greece was caused not only by the errors and omissions of British intelligence, but also by the political considerations and concepts of the leaders of the British Government who, after all, determined the personnel of their own Intelligence organization. If Britain seems to be following a reactionary policy in Greece, there is an explanation and to one section of British opinion a complete justification.

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1. House of Commons Debates, 19 December 1944, col. 1619.

Both Churchill and Eden have denied any intention of shaping events in Greece to the advantage of Britain, and both have declared their intention of supporting the cause of democracy in Greece. On 8 December 1944 Churchill said:

> We stand upon the foundation of fair free elections based on universal suffrage. That is what we consider the foundation of democracy....Democracy is not based on violence, on terrorism, but on reason, on fair play, on freedom, on respecting other people's rights as well as your own ambition.[1]

On 20 December Eden disclaimed any political motive for British intervention in Greek affairs amid interruptions from the Left who questioned his version of the British position.

> We seek nothing for ourselves in Greece at all. We seek neither strategic advantages nor economic advantages nor any other advantages of that kind at all....In this action we are taking we have no ulterior motive whatever. We really have not. I do not see why hon. Members are so eager to think we have some sinister purpose.
>
> Mr. Shinwell (Seaham): I am very sorry to have to interrupt. My right hon. Friend may have taken note of the fact that the Minister of Labour /Bevin/, at the Labour Party Conference, did refer to the Mediterranean position.
>
> Mr. Eden: Of course, it is true we have an interest in the Mediterranean. That has never been denied by anyone, but I say that we took this action above all, and only to try to bring food and supplies to Greece, because we knew of the condition in which we should find Greece. We had no ulterior motive....[2]

A Conservative back-bencher, Major Mott-Radclyffe, paraphrased and classified the statements of the Government leaders into three aims--the stopping of the shooting, distribution of relief material, and the creation of conditions which would permit of free elections at which the Greek people would be free to choose the Government they want.[3] These conditions, the Conservatives assert, can not be fulfilled if EAM resists the legal Greek Government.[4]

The Conservatives' objection to EAM springs in part from a natural hesitation to grant full acceptance to what they consider a violent minority. Perhaps some would not go so far as Churchill and

1. House of Commons Debates, 8 December 1944, cols. 926-27.
2. Ibid., 20 December 1944, col. 1901.
3. Ibid., 20 December 1944, col. 1864.
4. Ibid., 20 December 1944, cols. 1883-84.

classify the members of EAM as "murder gangs," but some would certainly go further.[1] It is extremely difficult for a man trained in the comparative order of English life and English politics to reconcile his own theories of democracy with the principles upheld by a resistance group which has evolved its theory and practice of politics in the work of the underground. It is particularly difficult for a Conservative with his emphasis upon legality and his preference for the British pattern of constitutional monarchy, although all Conservatives may not share Churchill's well-publicized weakness for "kings and princelings."

The British Government leaders have emphasized the need for law and order in Greece. Conservatives in and out of the Government feel that the men best fitted to establish and maintain a stable Government--not by force--are the men with a stake in an orderly society, rather than the resistance leaders. In the long run, argue the Conservatives, the very qualities which made the resistance leaders the group best fitted to harass the Germans unfit them to be the permanent leaders of the Greek Government.[2] They refuse to see in EAM anything more than a heroic group of extremists, eager to seize the opportunity of establishing themselves as the leaders of Greece and see no inconsistency in using these extremists for military purposes, although distrusting their political ability. An editorial in The Observer of 10 December expressed the doubts about EAM which are felt by British Conservatives.

> Here lies the heart of the controversy. Are the ELAS leaders, as Mr. Churchill claims, a gang of brigands plotting a dictatorship of the Left? Or are they, as others assert, the spokesmen of a broad-based popular movement, stirred to action by a well-founded fear that the disarming of the guerrillas was the first move in a reactionary and royalist plot to set up a dictatorship of the Right? Let us beware of depicting the turbulent Greek scene in simple blacks and whites. It is highly probable that on both sides there are extremists who would establish tyranny by armed intrigue if they were given

1. House of Commons Debates, 20 December 1944, cols. 1882-88. (Lieut. Colonel Wise). Lieut.-Colonel Wise seems to be one of the most convinced Tory die-hards. He is on the Advisory Board of the Imperial Policy Group, was a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship, and in 1940 described the Soviets as "a pack of murderers, the enemies of God and man; their armed force is worthless as an ally." Smethwick Telephone, 24.2.40, quoted in Your M.P., 86-87.
2. Ibid., 8 December 1944, col. 964.

> the chance. And Britain's pledge to the Greek people is that no extremists shall have this chance....No simple rule can be fixed to guide British policy in liberated lands. Many fine men and women are in the resistance movements; they are going to play an invaluable part in the reconstruction of their countries. But resistance movements are not composed exclusively of liberal-minded patriots; they include Left extremists who are as ready to be ruthless and dictatorial as any reactionaries of the Right. The men and Ministers whom Britain must seek out and support are those who, whatever their nominal political affiliations, can be trusted to accept freedom of election and the rule of law. And let us be sure, whenever we take responsibility for holding the ring, that we hold it firmly and impartially until a government capable of ruling with popular approval has been found.[1]

The great exponent of the type of democracy so disliked by the Conservatives is Soviet Russia, for to the Conservatives Communism is tyranny, not democracy. Any popular movement containing Communists or Left-wingers sympathetic to Communism arouses their distrust, for, despite the wartime alliance, British Conservatives have not been able to free themselves of a dislike and distrust of the Soviet Union. Russia's great strength and power threaten Britain's position in more than one area of joint interest and conflict. The British under Churchill have made a supreme effort to maintain their strength and prestige at its traditional level, and they are nervous about Russia's own wartime expansion. To compensate for the growth of Russian influence in the northern Balkans, they seek to maintain Britain's own influence in Greece. This aspect of the Greek situation receives little public expression by Conservatives--either in the press or in Parliament--but it is strongly emphasized by their Leftist critics. An article in The New Statesmen and Nation of 23 December declared that the fear of Russia was the dominant motive for British intervention in Greece.

> Take first the question of intervention in Greece which so rightly troubles the minds of...very many in this country. The blunt fact, always clear to students of politics but seldom stated in crude terms by a member of the British Cabinet, was explained by Mr. Bevin at last week's Labour Party Conference. The negotiations that preceded the use of violence by Britain, question whether EAM was tricked by the British or broke its

1. The Observer, 10 December, 1944.

> word in not disarming--these details of timing and maneuvre are not important. Mr. Churchill is attempting to destroy EAM which undoubtedly represents the main part of the national movement in Greece, because he fears Communist influence in an area which he regards as vital to Britain's strategic future.... If Mr. Bevin had been rather more frank with the Labour Party Conference, he would have added to his revelation that Russia demanded a free hand in Rumania and left Britain a free hand in Greece, the further explanation that the Soviet Union asked for Rumania as a sphere of influence because she had experience of intrigues in the Balkans against her security, while Britain wants to dominate the Aegean because in the event of war with Russia, she hopes to be in a position to shut the Dardanelles. That is putting the matter bluntly.[1]

Since the Conservatives fear Russia's strength, they are reluctant to give political support to any movement that seems likely to be dominated by Communists or Communist sympathizers. Any weakening of Britain's Mediterranean position they fear might be fatal in any future war with Russia.

B. The Opposition's Attitude

Within Britain criticism of the Government's Greek policy has to a considerable degree paralleled the American criticism of Britain's policy: (a) that Britain is supporting a reactionary clique,[2] (b) Britain is again playing power politics by attempting to carve out for itself a sphere of influence in Greece, to the ultimate detriment of world peace.[3] This criticism has not been confined to the Left either in the press or in the House of Commons. The Times, The Manchester Guardian, and The Economist have opposed the Government's Greek policy as well as The New Statesman and Nation, Tribune, and The Daily Worker. In the House of Commons Sir Percy Harris, Liberal leader, and Arthur Greenwood, leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party, have protested along with Left-wing Labour's Aneurin Bevan, the Commonwealth leader Sir Richard Acland, and the Communist William Gallacher.[4] The press of the extreme Left has criticized

1. The New Statesman and Nation, 23 December 1944.
2. House of Commons Debates, 8 December 1944, col. 957.
3. Ibid., 20 December 1944, col. 1868.
4. Ibid., 20 December 1944, cols. 1866-70 (Sir Percy Harris); cols. 1858-64 (Arthur Greenwood); cols. 1874-80 (Aneurin Bevan); cols. 1892-95 (William Gallacher); ibid., 8 December 1944, cols. 917-24 (Sir Richard Acland).

the Government mainly upon ideological grounds,[1] whereas the Economist, Guardian and Times have emphasized the dangers of the course which Britain seems to be following.[2]

Editorial and Parliamentary comment on the issue has been very repetitious and more emotional than is customary in the British press. In general, the Left has argued along these lines: the EAM is a broadly-based popular movement, not a "murder gang"; Churchill is trying to cast Europe back into the old discredited pattern with the same old Governments, now out of touch with the people; the Churchill policy is sowing the seeds of future wars, both civil and national, throughout Europe; Britain's prestige in Europe and with her great allies is falling with dangerous rapidity.[3] The Left has not objected so much to the British policy as outlined by the Government as they have to the manner in which that policy has been implemented.[4]

The most thoughtful criticism of the Government's policy has been in The Economist.[5] The Economist was at pains to dissociate itself from the left-wing criticisms, characterizing them as "the familiar sentimental muddle-headed misreading of the issues, by men who, after all that has happened, still can not see that no party that wants to keep a private army can be a friend of democracy." Nor did The Economist sympathize with Allied censure of British policy: "Russian criticisms of intervention do not come well from the creators of the Lublin Committee and the American assumption of lofty moral superiority, imparted de haut en bas to the British and Italian Governments as to two client states of equal standing, sits equally badly on the sponsors of Darlan." But, continues The Economist, despite Mr. Churchill's statement upon the Greek situation, it is no longer certain that British policy is founded upon the principle of law and order. There is evidence of serious partiality

1. News Chronicle, 8 December 1944.
2. Manchester Guardian, 9 December 1944; The Economist, 10 December 1944; The Times, 14 December 1944.
3. CID #XL 2782; House of Commons Debates, 8 December 1944; cols. 908-17, 917-24; 20 December 1944, cols. 1874-82.
4. Ibid., 20 December 1944, col. 1878.
5. The Economist, 9 December 1944.

on the part of the British: they have not insisted upon equal disarmament of the Right and of the Left; they have not been impartial in the matter of the composition of the Government. To refute these charges against the British Government, it must be proved "up to the hilt" that a real threat of revolutionary violence existed on the Left, and that the Papandreou Government is supported by "men who genuinely resisted the Germans and who hope for a democratic and progressive future for Greece, and not only by Royalists, Right Wing guerrillas and the timid centre of all those who desire no more than law and order, whether it is the Germans or the British who provide it for them. It must be proved above all that British influence has been used with utter impartiality and that the noisiness and ebullience of the Left has not led the British authorities both in London and on the spot into disregard of the quieter, more skilful and more purposive machinations of the Royalist Right."

The Economist then attempted to explain Britain's reason for the adoption of her policy by summarizing the diplomatic developments of the last four years. Against Mr. Churchill's version of the Left-wing revolutionary challenge, The Economist found British support of King George of Greece and General Sosnkowski of Poland, the distrust of de Gaulle, and the favoring of Badoglio and the House of Savoy. The outstanding cause for this unhappy list of policy errors seemed to be Mr. Churchill, who appeared to have a "positive preference for discredited dynasties abroad." The only possible sensible explanation was that Churchill was still afraid of Soviet Russia. If so, this was most alarming, for Britain could not base its foreign policy on the Anglo-Soviet alliance and the Red scare at one and the same time. Open British hostility to Left-wing movements would put Britain into the position of Metternich--minus the support of the Holy Alliance. "This is the last role that Britain should hope to play. If we are to take sides, our side is with the liberals....What interest has such a community /a democracy/ in kings and princes?

What interest has it in bringing back the old discredited forces which nowhere resisted the advance of Hitlerism and have done nothing since to turn the invader out? A Britain radical in mood and liberal in foreign policy has a great role to play in Europe. Britain, friend of royalists and reactionaries, has none."[1]

In Parliament the Government has been subjected to persistent criticism and questioning on its policy in Greece. On 8 December Churchill won his decisive victory after making the question one of confidence. Conservative M.P.s, Liberal M.P.s and the Labour members of the Government--including a few other Labour M.P.s--voted with the Government; 30--mainly Labour--voted against the Government,[2] approximately 50 Labourites abstained.[3] On 20 December there was a second debate on Greece and, although there was no division, sentiment ran strongly against the Government, at least among the speakers.[4] It seems unlikely that Labour will leave the Government upon the issue, in view of the military situation and Ernest Bevin's assertion that the policy determined upon had the Labour Ministers support.[5] No recent issue of foreign policy, however, has aroused more controversy in the House, and continued opposition within and without Parliament may effect some modification of the Government's policy, although the large Conservative majority insures Churchill against the necessity of taking any moves that he does not wish to take.

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1. The Economist, 9 December 1944.
2. House of Commons Debates, 8 December 1944, cols. 1011-14.
3. The Glasgow Herald, 9 December 1944. "Mr. Arthur Greenwood, Mr. Pethick-Lawrence, Mr. Shinwell, and most of the Labour members on the Labour Opposition front bench abstained from voting, and so did at least 50 of their back-bench supporters....There were fully 450 members present in the House today, so that the division figures of 30 for the Leftist amendment and 279 for the Government did not represent as strong a voting position as had been anticipated."
4. There were 8 speeches, exclusive of interruptions and Eden's reply, on 20 December; only 3 of the speakers defended the Government's policy, and one of these three, Lieut.-Colonel Wise, was subjected to constant interruption and accused of being "a most distinguished supporter of Hitler and Franco." House of Commons Debates, 20 December 1944.
5. CID # XL2782.

ANNEX II. BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN GREECE

In spite of the prestige enjoyed by British intelligence services in most other parts of the world, the selection and methods of British agents operating in Greece have been criticized by numerous observers. An opinion attributed to Athens financial circles in April 1944 says:

> One of the principal reasons for the comparative failure of British propaganda is the ignorance or imperfect understanding of the true state of affairs in Greece; most people attribute this to faulty information obtained from British officers who have spent a short time in Greece and of necessity contacted only limited circles....[1]

An American correspondent cabled in December 1944 that he was "amazed by the deterioration of the British intelligence service /in Greece/ and its onesidedness; also by the complete lack of understanding of the Balkan mentality from highest to lowest, both here and in England. After the last war Britain produced such great Balkan experts as Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, the Buxton brothers and many others. Now no single outstanding person understands the Balkans, resulting in a catastrophic policy in these parts. This is all the more regrettable because the Russians do understand."[2]

Similar opinions as to the British intelligence in Greece were expressed in a newspaper despatch of 15 December 1944 from Constantine Poulos, an American reporter:

> One basic blunder that is in part responsible for the present state of affairs in Greece is the persistent efforts of British diplomatic officials to disregard, minimize and deprecate the power of the Greek left. Whether or not this blunder was deliberate is difficult to say. It is certain that these efforts have naturally led to an attempt to smear and defame a large portion of the Greek people.
>
> British military intelligence, however, which has been operating in Greece since 1942, and which saw at first hand the growth of organized resistance movement under the leadership of the left, has never made the same mistake.
>
> Evidently the wishful thinking of the Foreign Office and of the British Ambassador to Greece, Rex Leeper, has prevailed even over BMI. Scobie has persistently labeled the EAM as a "small minority."[3]

1. Weekly Greek Intelligence Summary, Cairo, No. 17, 21 June 1944.
2. OSS source H, 5 December 1944.
3. OSS source H, 15 December 1944.

ANNEX III. CHARACTER AND ORIENTATION OF EAM AND THE GREEK COMMUNISTS

The characterization of EAM and its Communist component which appears in the text is confirmed by various sources with widely different points of view. In November 1943, for instance, the president of the Board of Governors of the Bank of Greece, himself blacklisted by EAM, wrote to the German administrator Neubacher as follows:

> The EAM is not an organ of London or Moscow, neither is it a secret organization....In my opinion the EAM is a symbolic expression of protest, purely Greek, and is the most characteristic expression of our two and a half years of oppression. Unending privations and despair have driven our people to the thought of a communist paradise; but the Greek, a merchant by nature and highly individualistic, has no instinctive sympathy for communism....[1]

John Politis, Greek Minister to Italy at the outbreak of the war, and until recently Greek representative on the Advisory Council for Italy, has expressed similar views:

> Communism, as a slogan, has acquired new followers in considerable numbers since the enemy occupation. It is difficult, however, to recognize the features of a conscious communism. Communism in Greece is rather a rallying point for all the discontented, whose number constantly increases because of the severe ordeals through which the country is going. One must keep in mind that 87 percent of the Greek population are farmers and that the agrarian reforms introduced more than twenty years ago have been almost completely realized, and have provided each one of these farmers with a portion of land which he owns entirely. It is difficult to imagine that Greek farmers would prefer to become salaried farm laborers by voting for a regime which would nationalize the means of production and hence also the land.[2]

An American observer who travelled through large portions of Greece in May and June 1944 spoke as follows regarding the application of the word "Communist" to Greek affairs. "The 'Communists,'" he wrote, "are those who believe strongly in the sanctity of private property, the family, the church; the 'conservatives' are irresponsible persons who are willing to overthrow all order to achieve their ends."[3]

1. R & A Report No. 1661, The Role of Communism in the Balkans.
2. Ibid.
3. OSS, R & A Cairo, 5 August 1944.

ANNEX IV. EFFECTS OF THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT FROM EAM-ELAS

In Western Macedonia early in August 1944, the Germans captured a British munitions dump from which fighting ELAS troops had pleaded in vain for supplies. The EAM unit concerned reported to its headquarters in the following telegram:

> Three battalions have been in heavy fighting with the Germans against considerable odds for the past ten days. We ask the Allied Mission daily for air cover and ammunition, since the enemy's big motorized columns are moving about without hindrance. Five days ago the Mission received from Cairo the almost incredible answer that it would be necessary that the expenditure of ammunition be witnessed by an Allied officer, after which an order might be put in for replacement. Difficult and continuous battles have been in progress for the last three days. We made another urgent plea for ammunition. Today we have little ammunition left and are compelled to withdraw....The Greek people are being slaughtered and burned; they have been betrayed by faithless allies.[1]

When it became obvious that the Germans would shortly withdraw, Allied liaison officers were instructed that ELAS groups to which they were assigned should not be allowed to accept surrender of German units less than a division in strength. Since the condition was impossible of fulfillment, it was clear that ELAS was to be permitted to accept the surrender of no German troops, though a number of German garrisons had shown willingness to surrender and American officers with the ELAS were eager to accept. A noteworthy instance is that of the garrison of Volos, whose Austrian commander was eager to turn the town and harbor over if he could receive Allied assurances of safety for his men. Despite American willingness to accept the surrender, the British refused, and in consequence the harbor installations and breakwater, and the railway station and shops were destroyed and the Germans escaped. The motive for the British instructions was clearly to prevent arms from falling into the hands of ELAS.[2] Instructions looking to similar ends were issued to the Security Battalions. Those in German-occupied territory were instructed to hold on against possible ELAS attack until they could join the British. Those outside German-occupied territory were told to disperse to their homes quietly, with t their weapons, and to reassemble when the British arrived.

1. Weekly Greek Intelligence Summary, Cairo, No. 25, 9 August 1944.
2. American eyewitness reports.

ANNEX V. BRITISH ACTIONS AT THE LEBANON CONFERENCE

The Greek point of view during and after the Lebanon Conference is illustrated by a letter from Exindaris (at present Greek representative on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy) to Mr. Noel Baker:

Cairo, 6 July 1944

My dear Mr. Minister and friend:

I had already sent you about six weeks ago a long letter about the development of our political problems here; also a copy of my letter to Mr. Leeper on the same subject.

Events, alas, have proved that I was only too right. The entente between the government and the parties or organizations collaborating with EAM could not be achieved. The reason is a psychological one. Mr. Papandreou had, from the very first, taken too categoric a stand against the EAM to gain its confidence. Moreover, the government's methods, supported by Mr. Leeper, injure the feeling of equality /egalite/ so deeply rooted among the Greeks. While Mr. Papandreou has every opportunity and facility to publish criticisms of the conduct of EAM, its representatives lack the same means to expose their point of view.

Consequently there is a false atmosphere and oppressive feeling which prevent the examination of questions with all the desired objectivity and coolness.

But this oppressive atmosphere covers not only the representatives of EAM but also all those who are supposed to be unsympathetic to Mr. Papandreou. Five days ago Mr. Lambrakis (see my last letter), who had at last been set free, and who, since his arrival here, has scrupulously abstained from the slightest expression of opinion about the government, was once more exiled to Syria by the "Security," without any explanation to him which would justify this act.

Whether this action was taken by the British authorities at the instigation of the Greek Government, or on their own initiative, the effect was none the less deplorable. The incident brings to mind the methods which were thought to be the sad privilege of dictatorial regimes.

Nor should I hide from you the fact that Mr. Papandreou, in his statements, abuses the support given him by the British Government. On every occasion he reiterates that he enjoys the special protection of Mr. Churchill. Every time he wishes to do or avoid doing something, according to the dictates of his political interests, he puts forward the desires of Mr. Churchill or Mr. Eden. "Mr. Churchill wants or does not want this; Mr. Eden wants or does not want this," etc. You can imagine from this how the Greeks, whose caustic wit and independent spirit you know, comment on this type of statement.

All this is leading us little by little into civil war, which we should have and could have avoided had it not been for the initiative taken by Mr. Leeper and his persistence in an erroneous policy, either because he had gone too far to withdraw, so far as his government was concerned, or because he has a sort of phobia for all leftist phenomena. I cannot contemplate without trembling the possible consequence of such a policy if carried out to its conclusion. Can the evil be stopped in time? I do not wish to give up hope. All my being is in revolt at the idea that we may be pushed into final catastrophe. The Greek people has not deserved that.

Please give my regards to Mme. Baker.

Cordially yours,

P.S. I was about to hand over this letter to the person who will transmit it to you, when I learned that the conditions of EAM had been rejected by the government with, it seems, the approval of Mr. Leeper. Enclosed you will find these conditions. Is there still time to remedy the damage? I do not believe so, not much. Still, to the very last minute, I shall use every effort to have the conversations resumed. But, given the state of mind which reigns here, I must admit to being rather sceptical of the results.

ANNEX VI. PAPANDREOU'S DISREGARD OF HIS CABINET

Papandreou's habit of dealing directly with the British and of disregarding the existence of his cabinet has been exemplified on two occasions since the liberation of Greece: (1) The order that the resistance groups must disband by 10 December 1944 was announced after Papandreou had been in conference with General Scobie, but without the acquiescence of his cabinet. (2) At the end of November 1944 Papandreou had agreed with his cabinet that the Mountain Brigade should be disbanded; but on 29 November, after consultation with the British, he presented a statement that the Brigade should be retained. Siantos, present at the meeting, said on this occasion: "So, between ourselves we agree; it is only the British who keep us from coming together and solving our problems."[1]

1. OSS source A #46488, 7 December 1944.

ANNEX VII. BRITISH SUPPORT OF RIGHTIST ORGANIZATIONS AFTER LIBERATION

A. The Mountain Brigade

When the Mountain Brigade was landed in the Piraeus early in November 1944 it was met only by Papandreou in his capacity as Minister of War; leftist members of the cabinet were conspicuously absent. Immediately upon arrival, the Mountain Brigade men tore a picture of Stalin in Constitution Square, stopped passersby on the street, forcing them to pay verbal homage to the King at pistol's point, and delivered royalist sympathizers from prison. Because of the disorders they engendered they were confined to barracks. They were put into active service after the fateful demonstration of 3 December, and thereafter figured prominently in news of the fighting against ELAS. The British claimed on 15 December that some ELAS men had been wearing captured Mountain Brigade uniforms in order to create confusion. It is equally likely, however, that some of the Brigade may have actually gone over to ELAS rather than fight for the British when the issue came to a test.

B. Security Battalions

Upon liberation, many Security Battalion officers and also officers of the Metaxas Security Service (secret police), which was even more objectionable to EAM, were arrested by EAM police and incarcerated in the Averof prison. Subsequent reports indicated that the British had been systematically removing prisoners from Averof prison, on the pretext that they were to be taken to other places of detention, and actually outfitting them with Mountain Brigade uniforms and enlisting them in the Mountain Brigade or other "nationalist" organizations.[1] According to one reliable report, the great majority of the officers inducted into the new National Guard (Ethnofilaki) were also from the Security Battalions or were ex-Metaxists or royalists.[2]

1. OSS source A #45151, 14 November 1944; OSS source H, 25 November 1944; OSS, R & A Athens, 20, 27 November 1944.
2. Ibid.

C. The Khi Organization

According to its leader, Colonel Grivas, the Khi organization, which had been receiving British arms, attacked EAM on orders from the Greek Government in late September and again about 10 October 1944. Grivas stated that Khi was instructed to prevent the Communists from gaining control of Athens before the arrival of the British, and thereafter was not disarmed but was told to retain its arms in case of a "Communist" attack or attempted coup.[1] On 3 December it was reported that Khi, armed with heavy and light machine guns, mortars, modern rifles and abundant ammunition, were in control of Philopappos Hill (near Theseion Square) and of part of the Pnyx; two British trucks were seen delivering ammunition. Throughout 3 December the men kept firing, against no opposition, and the observer judged that the purpose could only be to terrorize the population. EAM began to return their fire on 4 December.[2]

D. PAO

In mid-November 1944, it was reported that the British were supporting PAO in the Drama area, and that Security Battalion officers were crossing the Struma in order to join PAO.[3]

1. OSS source A #45149, 7 November 1944.
2. OSS source A #45590, 5 December 1944.
3. OSS source A #45098, 16 November 1944.